The homogenization effect of land titling on investment incentives: evidence from Peru by Fort, R.
NJAS 55-4, 2008 325
The homogenization effect of land titling on 
investment incentives: evidence from Peru
R. Fort
Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, P.O. Box, 8130, NL-6700 EW Wageningen, 
 The Netherlands
Present address: Grupo de Análisis para el Desarollo (GRADE), Lima, Peru (e-mail: rfort@grade.org.pe) 
Received 21 June 2007; accepted 14 May 2008
Abstract
Land titling programmes have been widely promoted as a necessary condition for enhancing farmer’s 
incentives to invest in their land. The justification for public intervention of this type is increasingly 
questioned on the grounds of its limitation to replace or improve the effect of informal or customary 
rights already in place. If the main aim of the programme is to formalize previous land rights and its 
procedure is based on the recognition of informal documents and reliance on community rules, it 
could in fact contribute to increased farmer’s tenure security and therefore boost land investments. 
We explored this relationship for a sample of Peruvian farmers who were part of a state-led land titling 
programme that shared the aforementioned characteristics. Using retrospective information on the type 
of informal documents that parcels had before the start of the programme we were able to categorize the 
parcels at two levels of initial tenure security. The effect of titling on investments was then analysed for 
these two groups, using a difference-in-differences estimation technique. The results show that there is 
a positive effect of titling on the probability of making investments as well as on the value of investments 
for both groups of parcels, but also prove that the impact of titling is greater for parcels with previously 
low levels of tenure security. This effect could be almost entirely attributed to changes in farmer’s 
willingness to invest and not to better access to credit.
Additional keywords: informal rights, investment incentives, tenure security
Introduction
Because of the potential effect of land titling programmes on farmers’ willingness 
and ability to make efforts to invest in their land, such programmes have been widely 
promoted as a necessary condition for enhancing the investments. Two different 
types of arguments are commonly used in the debate on the impact of land titling on 
investments. On the one hand, the lack of tenure security can create a risk of land 
loss, causing a drop in expected income from investments. On the other hand, it may 
shorten the farmers’ time horizon, and discourage them from performing actions 
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that would increase benefits over time. A clear definition and registration of full-
fledged private property rights to provide land holders with the required level of tenure 
security would solve these problems and enhance farmers’ willingness to invest in the 
land (Demsetz, 1967; Feder et al., 1988; Barzel, 1989; Libecap, 1989; Feder & Feeny, 
1991; Besley, 1995; Binswanger et al., 1995). At the same time, the establishment of 
freehold titles increases the collateral value of land for credit lenders by reducing their 
foreclosure cost in case of default, allowing farmers to receive better credit conditions 
to finance their investment projects (Carter et al., 1994; Besley, 1995; Binswanger et al., 
1995; Carter & Olinto, 2003).  
 Although there is little disagreement about the role of these factors at conceptual 
level, their relative importance in explaining the investment effect – and its 
consequences in terms of the distributional implications of land titling – have been 
subject to much debate in the literature. In settings where credit markets are missing 
or do not function well, there may be little justification for this type of intervention 
when the lack of credit was thought to be the main limitation for investments (Platteau, 
1996). If titling only improves credit access for farmers that were already better off 
(Zimmerman & Carter, 1999; Carter & Olinto, 2003), then the titling policy will cause 
concerns in terms of its distributional effect. On the other hand, if the lack of tenure 
security is the principal constraint for farmers to undertake investments, and titling 
helps to improve it, the policy may provide large benefits to the poor who are usually 
less able to acquire security by other informal means (Deininger & Chamorro, 2004). 
 The need for public intervention in the provision of land titles with the intention to 
increase tenure security has received much criticism in the literature. A large part of 
that criticism comes from studies in different African countries where titling policies 
proved to be ineffective for enhancing investments. The principal argument of these 
studies is that in customary land areas, basic land rights (i.e., freely choosing which 
crop to grow, freely marketing of harvest output, preventing others from exploiting the 
same parcel) provided by local authorities or custom seem to be sufficient to induce 
land holders to invest, and that adding transfer rights (assumed to be brought by titling) 
does not appear to significantly improve investment incentives. Apparently, the local 
informal order embedded in the rural communities of these areas guarantees basic 
land rights to all villagers that are sufficient to induce investments. In this situation 
there will be no need for the state to intervene through centralized procedures aimed at 
formalizing land rights (Atwood, 1990; Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; Platteau, 1992; Bruce 
& Migot-Adholla, 1994; Platteau, 1996).
 Even though property rights regimes 1 may differ between African and Latin 
American rural societies, some researchers have started to transmit these concerns 
about the relationship between customary or informal rights and the introduction 
of full-fledged private property rights to the debate on the latter region. According to 
Zoomers & Van Der Haar (2000), this interplay constitutes one of the most important 
issues that require further investigation to better understand the current land tenure 
situation in Latin America. Most studies that attempt to measure the effects of land 
titling policies in Latin America disregard informal land rights that are currently in 
place. One of the reasons for not considering these informal land rights could be 
related to the fact that titling policies in the region have been mostly oriented to the 
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‘formalization’ of individual rights over pieces of land that were already privately held, 
and not so much to the process of ‘privatization’ of land held before under other types 
of property regimes.2 Even where the principal scope of the policy is the formalization 
of individual rights, it seems far too simplistic to assume that there were either no 
informal rights governing the rules of use and exchange of land before the titling policy 
took place, or that these rights were ‘homogeneous’ amongst all plots and farmers such 
that the levels of tenure security before titling were all the same.
 Relaxing these assumptions compels us to explore the different ways in which 
farmers build and enforce their private rights over the land, and to observe whether 
or not these different arrangements result in heterogeneous levels of tenure security 
and investments across parcels. In particular, we want to know whether there is a 
correlation between selected indicators of households’ wealth and market integration 
and the probability of holding a document that provides higher levels of tenure security, 
and also whether parcels with these types of documents presented higher investment 
levels prior to the start of the land titling programme. If the latter is the case, it could be 
expected that the effect of the titling programme on tenure security and investments, 
if any, would depend on that initial level. A higher effect on investments for parcels 
with a low level of tenure security prior to the entitling programme would indicate a 
justification for the programme, not only from an efficiency point of view but also from 
an equity perspective.
 This paper explores these hypotheses by using information from the Peruvian Land 
Titling and Registration Programme. The particular history of land distribution in 
Peru, as well as the characteristics of the programme’s implementation process and the 
performance of the sample of farmers selected for this study, makes this case particularly 
interesting and appropriate for addressing our research questions. The rest of the paper 
is divided into five chapters. The first chapter contains an overview of the changes in 
land policies in Peru during the last three decades, and presents key aspect of the land 
titling programme under analysis. The second chapter describes the database used for 
this study, presents a classification of parcels by tenure status before the start of the 
programme, and formalizes our hypothesis. The third chapter deals with the econometric 
model to be estimated and with some of its potential problems. The estimation results are 
presented in the fourth chapter, followed by some concluding remarks.   
Land tenure reform in Peru
During the last three decades the legal framework regarding land issues in Peru has 
radically changed from a strongly regulated process towards a more market-based 
perspective. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1969, which sets the base line for a large 
transformation of the agrarian structure, was followed by many restrictive laws 
about the use of land. Following the expropriation of the large haciendas from their 
previous owners a co-operative land ownership scheme was introduced together with 
new legislation prohibiting to sell the land received during this process. By the end 
of the 1970s, most of these co-operatives went bankrupt and many farmers and their 
organizations initiated movements to push the government for a change in this law. 
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Legislative Decree 85 of 1981 established the possibility of dissolving agricultural co-
operatives in an attempt to promote a change in their management, but this turned out 
to be the beginning of the fragmentation of many of them, transferring small pieces 
of land to their members.3 Most of the time, these transfers from co-operatives to 
individual members did not encompass a property title issued by the state but only an 
informal document provided by the dissolved co-operative. In some cases there was no 
document at all.
 During the 1990s, Peru turned towards a more liberal regime in terms of land 
ownership and land use. In 1991, the government passed Laws 653 and 667, which 
promoted cadastral and titling policies for rural areas and also lifted some of the 
previous restrictions on land sales, rentals and mortgages. According to Zegarra (1999), 
in 1990 only 10% of the estimated total number of parcels was registered in the registry 
office. From this moment onwards, the definition of private property and the demands 
for well-defined property rights over the land became more important. 
 The Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras (PETT Programme) was started 
in 1992 in order to promote land titling and improve the situation of many farmers 
with different types of informal documents supporting their land ownership status. 
The programme has a nation-wide perspective with the objective of constructing a 
rural cadastral system with validity all over the country. By the end of 2005, the PETT 
Programme managed to title and to register more than 1.5 million parcels, increasing 
the percentage of formally owned plots to more than 50%. Over the last seven years the 
programme budget amounted to more than 100 million US dollars, making it also one 
of the largest formalized programmes for rural areas in the developing world.4
Different steps taken in the Programa Especial de Titulación de Tierras
The diagram in Figure 1 shows the different steps followed by the programme for 
awarding a registered title.5 The methodology implemented by PETT during the titling 
and registration (T&R) process is one of ‘universal coverage’, which in principle rules 
out any potential self-selection bias of programme participants and typical problems 
of reverse causality between titling and some impact variables such as investment. 
The programme is completely free of charge for farmers and works in a strongly 
decentralized way, with several regional offices sending their personnel to the field 
simultaneously. The first step in the process is to create a cadastral database of all the 
parcels within a certain region (normally a valley, which in turn is divided into several 
‘sectors’). PETT officials rely on aerial photography, contrasting the photos with the 
actual parcel information collected later on in the field together with the owner and the 
adjacent neighbours (Bordering). Information about the owner, field characteristics, 
and proof of informal rights over the land are also collected at this stage (Census). 
Based on this information the PETT regional office then produces a Registry certificate, 
which will be required for the entire titling process (Registry Certificate).  
 The next step in the process consists in registering the ownership rights in the 
public registration system (SUNARP).6 To that end PETT officials use the information 
recovered in the Census to distinguish two levels of proof of ownership over the parcels 
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(Proof of Ownership and Possession). If the documents presented by the farmer to 
the PETT officials provide enough evidence of ownership then the complete file for 
that parcel is ready to be sent to SUNARP. These documents include previous titles 
issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, private transfer contracts certified by a notary, or 
judicial resolutions. If the farmer could not present any document to prove his rights 
over the parcel or only has other documents not considered as proof of ownership, the 
procedure consists in issuing first a Certificate of Possession, later on to be converted 
into an Ownership Certificate for entering in the registers of SUNARP. 
 In order to obtain a Certificate of Possession, the farmer has to prove direct, 
continuous, peaceful, and public possession of the parcel for a minimum of 1 year 
for state land or 5 years for private land. To do so, it is enough to present a written 
declaration of all adjacent neighbours or a declaration of the producers association in 
the region. Adding any other document that shows possession is recommended but not 
mandatory. This Certificate of Possession together with the Registry Certificate is then 
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Figure 1. Diagram representing the steps followed by the PETT Programme for awarding a registration title.
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sent to SUNARP to register the possession right of the farmer. If accepted, SUNARP 
will then notify the owner and all community neighbours about the registration and 
give them 30 days to file any complaint. If by that time no complaint has been filed, 
SUNARP will proceed with the registration of the ownership rights. The final step in 
the process is the delivery of the registered titles to the owners, which is commonly 
done in a massive way with a public ceremony. 
The classification of sampled parcels by tenure status
The database used for this study was collected during the last months of 2004 as part 
of the socio-economic evaluation process of the PETT Programme.7 The survey was 
conducted amongst more than 2000 farmers distributed over five different regional 
domains in the Coastal and Andean region of Peru.8 The sample frame used for this 
study was the National Registry Database, with information on more than 2 million 
parcels at the national level. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a parcel is added to 
this database when it just started the T&R process, which means that in principle all 
parcels are potential beneficiaries of the programme. In 2004, the year when the design 
was implemented, some of these parcels had already received a registered title, whereas 
other ones had not. This difference was the main feature for the initial selection of 
parcels as ‘treatments’ or ‘controls’.
 An important concern about this initial classification was the potential difference 
in registration time between a parcel with formal proof of ownership and a parcel 
that could only show actual possession. It is reasonable to think that the latter would 
encounter more conflicts and procedures to get an ownership registration. If this is the 
case, there will probably be heterogeneity in whether or not farmers ever receive a title 
and in the timing of receipt of title, and exogeneity of treatment will be compromised. 
However, there is an important characteristic of the programme that excludes this 
possibility. The titles are not issued on an individual basis but in a public ceremony. 
This means that officials normally wait until all or most of the parcels of a sector are 
titled and registered.9 So heterogeneity in the time it takes to receive a title depending 
on the previous documents should not be a concern. Using a survey’s question about 
the time it took to receive a title since the last visit of the PETT officials, we found 
that there was no statistically significant difference in time between farmers that had 
documents to show ownership and farmers who could only show possession of parcels 
(13 months for both groups).10
 The survey also recovered recall-information on some variables that are of particular 
interest for this study. For example, data were collected for different types of land-
attached investments made in each parcel of the household, recording also the year that 
the investments were made. In terms of the tenure status of each parcel, we collected 
information on the type of document the owners currently held as a proof of ownership 
or possession, and the year in which the document was issued, as well as on the type of 
document they held previously. This information helped us to reconstruct the changes 
in tenure status for each parcel of the household throughout the years, and in particular 
to identify the previous status of the parcels before being T&R by the PETT Programme. 
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We saw that the PETT Programme in fact makes a distinction between the different 
types of informal documents during the T&R process. Some documents contain 
enough initial evidence of ownership, whereas other ones first need to be ‘validated’ by 
the rest of the community members and by the Registry Office. This issue is an implicit 
recognition of previous land rights and might also be related to different levels of 
tenure security before titling. Even if these informal documents do not provide farmers 
with a complete ‘bundle of rights’ over their land, in some cases they can be sufficient 
to give farmers the tenure security needed to reduce their perception about any risk of 
losing the land in a dispute. If disputes over the land are mostly of local nature and can 
normally be solved by local authorities, it is likely that some of these documents provide 
enough enforcement power to make farmers feel secure. Moreover, if land transactions 
mostly occur between community members, some of these documents could provide 
enough security to the buyer in case of sales or to the owner of the land in case of 
leasing land for a period of time. 
 With this classification in mind, we made a further distinction in our treatment 
and control groups. Within the controls (parcels without T&R) we divided the parcels 
into parcels with ‘low tenure security’ (LTS) and parcels with ‘medium tenure security’ 
(MTS) according to the type of document that they currently held. Within the treatment 
group (parcels with T&R) we made use of retrospective information on the type of 
document they held before getting the PETT title so as to be able to subdivide these 
parcels in a similar way. Table 1 presents the distribution of parcels over these groups 
according to regional domains. 
 The parcels categorized as LTS were the ones without any document that proved 
possession or ownership, or the ones with a possession certificate issued by a Ministry 
of Agriculture’s local agency or a peasants community, or a certificate of having 
registered a piece of public/abandoned land on your name. The parcels categorized 
as MTS were the ones with old titles issued by the Ministry of Agriculture, a buy-sell 
contract, or some type of public deed certified by a local judge or notary. The idea 
behind this categorization of parcels according to the type of documents was that land 
Table 1. Numbers of parcels by regional domain, tenure security group and presence or absence of titling 
& registration (T&R).
Regional domain Medium tenure security Low tenure security Total
 With Without With Without
 T&R T&R T&R T&R
North Coast 69 71 148 93 381
Centre-South Coast 60 35 39 17 151
North Andean 116 191 25 130 462
Centre Andean 220 227 148 128 723
South Andean 116 227 24 146 513
Total 581 751 384 514 2230
property rights in this setting could be better understood as a ‘continuum of rights’ 
instead of just a discrete indicator.11 In this sense, low tenure security documents 
provide inferior rights as they serve at the most to prove possession of a parcel, but 
they cannot be used as a proof of ownership. Medium tenure security documents can 
be used legally to prove ownership of a parcel but they lack ‘universal’ recognition and 
approval as they are not registered in the public system. In this continuum, registered 
titles provided by the PETT Programme are supposed to give farmers the highest 
tenure security over their parcels.12
 As mentioned in the introduction, we also wanted to know whether the probability 
of having an MTS document on a parcel before the programme had started is related 
to some characteristics of the farmers that would indicate a selection process to acquire 
them. In particular, we explored the possibility that farmers who are better off are more 
likely to have obtained an MTS document, so that the informal way of building land 
rights might be a constrained one. Table 2 shows the result of a Probit regression that 
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Table 2. Probability of having an MTS document on parcel. Situation 1994.
Variable  dy/dx 1 SE
Total farm size (ha)  0.020 *** 0.008
No. of household members  −0.004 0.006
Sex of household head  0.022 0.025
Spanish main language  0.181 *** 0.031
House located on parcel  0.059 * 0.031
Time to walk from parcel to district capital (min) −0.065 *** 0.007
Dummy Centre-South Coast  0.174 *** 0.030
Dummy North Andean  0.281 *** 0.025
Dummy Centre Andean  0.294 *** 0.032
Dummy South Andean  0.296 *** 0.027
No. of observations 2300
Pseudo R2 0.055
1 Statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01.
Table 3. Percentage of parcels with investments during the period 1990–2000, for the groups with low 
tenant security (LTS) or medium tenant security (MTS).
Group Year
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
LTS 11.1 11.8 14.0 15.0 15.8 16.9
MTS 17.2 17.8 20.5 22.4 23.0 23.5
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explains the probability of having an MTS document on a parcel before the start of the 
programme, in terms of some indicators of household’s wealth, education, or market 
integration.13
 As we can see from Table 2, the probability of having an MTS document increases 
with total farm size and with the proximity of the parcel to the district’s capital. 
Moreover, households where the head had Spanish as his main language – a variable 
strongly correlated with education – were also more likely to have acquired one of these 
documents. Finally, the positive relationship between stronger informal documents 
and higher initial levels of investment for the MTS and LTS groups is confirmed by the 
data in Table 3 over the period 1990–2000. 
 By using this classification of parcels we come to the following scenario for testing 
our hypothesis about the effect of T&R on investments for the two different groups 
of beneficiaries and controls (Figure 2). A detailed explanation of this figure, its 
construction using the data from our sample, and the estimator we derived from it, is 
provided in the chapter Results.
 Following the model presented by Besley (1995), we can think of our particular case 
as observing farmer’s investment decisions in two consecutive periods of time (period 
1 and period 2), with an exogenous change in his property rights in between. Parcel’s 
initial rights are heterogeneous in terms of the level of security that they provide, 
and thus can be classified into two groups accordingly: low tenure security parcels 
(LTS), and medium tenure security parcels (MTS). MTS parcels run a lower risk of 
expropriation and hence the marginal returns to capital, as well as the propensity 
to invest, are higher than those of LTS parcels. Under this scenario, the effect of 
the new assignment of rights can be derived from the observation on the change 
in the propensity to invest between period 1 and period 2. If the new rights do not 
contribute at all to a higher tenure security for the parcels, we shall expect no change 
in the propensity to invest in parcels of both groups. On the other hand, if the level of 
tenure security for the MTS parcels had already reached the maximum possible, we 
would anticipate no change for this type of parcels whereas a positive change would 
be expected for parcels in the LTS group. Finally, if the new rights enhance tenure 
A: MTS B: MTS C: LTS D: LTS
TREATMENT CONTROL TREATMENT CONTROL
E: T&R F: MTS G: T&R H: LTS
Period 1
Titling
Period 2
Figure 2. Methodological framework for testing the hypothesis about the effect of titling and registration 
(T&R) on investment for the low tenure security (LTS) and the medium tenure security (MTS) group.
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security levels for both groups of parcels, implying that their levels are ‘homogenized’ 
at a maximum, we would expect positive changes in both groups but also a higher 
increase for LTS parcels as these were more constrained before. In the next chapter we 
develop an estimation technique to test these hypotheses.
Econometric model and estimation strategy
The estimator that we wished to implement is called the Difference-in-Differences 
estimator (DID; Abadie, 2005). According to Figure 2, the differences we are 
interested in are [(E–A) – (F–B)] for the parcels with initial MTS, and [(G–C) – (H–D)] 
for the parcels with initial LTS. The idea is to compare the change in land-attached 
investments before and after the parcel was T&R, with the same change for the relevant 
control group. To measure this effect, we focused on the parcels that were T&R by the 
programme in the period 1994–2000 14, and divided them into two groups according 
to the type of document they held before titling, i.e., LTS and MTS. The control groups 
are then presented by parcels with the same type of document in period 1 but that had 
not been titled yet in period 2. 
 Retrospective data on land-attached investments included fixed investments in 
different types of installations such as warehouses, cattle yards, mills, drainage works, 
water canals, and fences, and in land improvements such as terraces and land-grading. 
Following the predictions of the theoretical model, we expected a farmer to undertake 
one of these investments only if the expected return for doing so would be positive. As 
T&R on a parcel is supposed to increase this return, we expect the proportion of these 
parcels with investments to be higher in period 2 than in period 1. Consequently, we 
measured investments (I) as follows:
             1 if at least 1 fixed investment was made on parcel i in period t
  Iit = 
             0 otherwise
 Investments were recorded for the periods 1990–1994 (period 1) and 2000–2004 
(period 2) in order to estimate the difference in the proportion of parcels undertaking 
land-attached investments before and after the treated parcels in our sample were T&R. 
To verify whether this change was not biased towards less valuable investments, we 
generated a variable for the value of these investments using auto-reported information 
on the money spent on the construction of these investments.15
 The decision to select as treated parcels only the T&R ones during the period 
1994–2000, excluding from the analysis parcels T&R between 2001 and 2004, mainly 
responded to the assumption that land-attached investments of the type referred to 
here are not undertaken continuously but rather sporadically. Given the retrospective 
nature of our data, and in order to have a relatively long period for registering 
investments, this selection was considered to be optimal.16
 Because these changes over time could be reflecting only a natural increase in the 
propensity to invest or renovate investments, or any other time trend associated with 
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the chosen periods, we made use of our control group to calculate DID estimates of the 
effect of T&R on these variables. So we assumed that the change in the situation of the 
control group between period 1 and period 2 was a good approximation of the change 
the treated group would have experienced in this period had they not  received the 
title.17 The equation that we estimated was as follows 18:
  Iit = α0 + α1(post)t + α2(TR)i + α3(post ∑ TR)it + β'Xit + εit
where α and β are coefficients; post is a period dummy, TR identifies the parcels 
in the treatment and control groups,  and Xit is a vector of parcel and household 
characteristics that could also be influencing the decision to invest. The period dummy 
post equals 0 for all observations in period 1 (1990–1994) and 1 in period 2 (2000–
The homogenization effect of land titling on investment incentives: evidence from Peru 
Table 4. Summary statistics. (see also note 20) 
Variable  Medium tenure security Low tenure security
  With Without  With Without
  T&R T&R t-value T&R T&R t-value
Investments
Investments  (1990–1994) 0.05 0.07 –1.23 0.03 0.06 –2.11
Investments (2000–2004) 0.10 0.07 2.17 0.10 0.06 1.69
Investments (S/.; 1990–1994) 1 6.77 14.09 –1.66 16.15 17.08 –0.08
Investments (S/.; 2000–2004) 27.81 35.61 –0.38 46.33 20.75 1.23
Parcel characteristics
Parcel at altitude (0: no; 1: yes) 0.21 0.19 0.76 0.16 0.18 –0.61
Erosion index (0: no problem; 0.40 0.33 2.06 0.36 0.33 0.81 
 3: strong erosion) 
Slope index (0: no problem; 0.73 0.69 1.09 0.57 0.62 –1.05
 2 pronounced)
Soil quality index (1: very bad; 3.23 3.15 2.53 3.18 3.16 0.47
 5: very good)
Parcel size (ha) 1.38 1.68 –1.21 1.70 1.36 1.44
Time to walk from house to parcel (min) 29.64 24.96 2.27 29.67 25.84 1.81
Road access to parcel (0: road not paved; 0.08 0.15 –3.94 0.12 0.19 –2.82
 1: paved road)
Household characteristics
Household size 3.81 3.91 –0.90 4.20 4.01 1.46
Sex household head (0: male; 1: female) 0.85 0.80 1.16 0.82 0.83 –0.35
Age household head (yrs) 63.36 63.28 0.11 60.44 63.79 –3.94
Education household head (yrs) 4.28 4.85 –2.66 4.33 4.21 0.48
Spanish main language 0.56 0.66 –3.45 0.56 0.62 –1.72
1 Investments are in New Peruvian Soles (S/.) in 2004. 1 US$ = 3.4 S/..
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2004). This dummy captures any aggregate factor that affects investments over time 
for both the treatment and the control groups. 
 As we were interested in the effect of T&R on parcels with an MTS document and 
parcels with an LTS document, this equation will be run separately for each group. The 
coefficient α3 of the interaction  post ∑ TR is the estimated programme effect, which 
provides a measure of the conditional average change in investments for treated parcels.
 Recent econometric studies suggest that in non-linear models the magnitude of the 
interaction effect is different from the marginal effect of the interaction term (Norton 
et al., 2004), and that for computing the real magnitude of the interaction effect one 
must calculate the cross-derivative of the expected value of the dependent variable. As 
the sign and values of this interaction effect might be different for different values 
of the explanatory variables, we present in Appendix 1A the sample averages for 
these parameters. Additionally, we ran a linear probability model 19 as an alternative 
estimation that allows us to verify our findings (Appendix 1B).
 Table 4 presents a comparison between the treatment and control groups for a set 
of parcel and household characteristics that could also influence investment decisions.
 The differences in investments between the periods and groups show an 
interesting result (Table 4). Whereas the percentage of treated parcels with investments 
increases over time for both groups, control parcels remain unaffected. In terms of 
other characteristics, the comparison between treated and control parcels for both 
groups reveals a few small differences. For both groups, the treated parcels appeared 
to be more difficult to access and the heads of the households had not been raised with 
Spanish as the main language. Erosion appeared to be a problem on treated parcels of 
the MTS group even though the soil quality index was higher. Within this group there 
also appeared a small but statistically significant difference in the level of education 
of the heads of the households between treated and control parcels. Finally, within 
the LTS group the heads of the households with treated parcels were slightly younger 
than those with control parcels. The incorporation of all these parcel and household-
related variables in the regression analysis (vector Xit) provides a simple way to adjust 
for observable differences between the different groups, and may also improve the 
efficiency of the estimate of α3 by reducing the residual variance.  
Results
Table 5 presents the DID estimates for the probability of having made a land-attached 
investment in the parcel (Probit model) and for the value of investments (Tobit model), 
controlling for the set of parcel and household characteristics presented before, plus 
dummy variables for the regional domains. 
 As can be seen from Table 5, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of 
post ∑ TR (α3) on the propensity to invest and on the value of investments in the MTS 
as well as in the LTS group of parcels. However, in both regressions the coefficients are 
smaller for the MTS group than for the LTS group. Compared with their pre-programme 
situation, receiving a title from the programme on the MTS parcels is associated with 
doubling the probability of making an investment, whereas on the LTS parcels the effect 
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of titling augmented the probability of making investments more than four times. This 
result confirms the presence of a ‘homogenization effect’ of T&R on investments. 
 Appendix 1A presents the results of the (average) calculated interaction effect using 
the Norton et al. (2004) method. Although the estimates of the interaction effect are 
lower for both groups, they are still statistically significant on average. Moreover, the 
results of the linear probability model in Appendix 1B show only a slight difference in 
magnitude of the α3 coefficient from the DID regression 21.  
 In order to verify whether these results reflect a change in the tenure security 
perception of farmers, or whether they have to be attributed to an improvement in credit 
access brought by titling, we pursued two alternative strategies.22 First, we distinguished 
between investments financed with credit and investments financed out of own pocket 
(OOP), and tested the effect of titling on the second category. This distinction is based 
on the respondents’ answer to the questions about the type of financing used for each 
investment that was made on a parcel. This strategy, however, does not rule out the 
possibility that improvements in credit access could have been used for other purposes, 
thus affecting investment incentives in an indirect way. However, as 97% of the reported 
investments were said to be financed OOP, we do not expect a significant difference 
when following this approach. Second, a related test was performed by isolating the 
effect of titling on investments amongst non-borrowing households. Only 7% of the 
households in the sample reported having access to formal sources of credit over the past 
three years. Although our survey did not record access to credit prior to the programme 
intervention, including borrowing households at that time did not invalidate our test as 
these households did not show an increase in credit access after the programme. If the 
investment effect is robust to this limitation, we confirm that the principal mechanism at 
work is the one related to a change in tenure security.  
Table 5. Probit and tobit estimates 1 from the difference-in-differences method applied to the full samples 
of parcels of medium and low tenure security.
Variable Probit 2  Tobit 3
 Medium tenure Low tenure Medium tenure Low tenure
 security security security security
 (n = 2186) (n =1547) (n = 2186) (n =1547)
post (α1) –0.002 –0.002  5.4  –5.2 
 (0.014) 4 (0.014) (17.3) (23.8)
TR (α2) –0.027 * 0.046 ** –34.8 * –64.8 **
 (0.015) (0.019) (19.7) (30.4)
post ∑ TR (α3) 0.054 ** 0.085 *** 54.1 ** 107.6 ***
 (0.027) (0.036) (29.1) (45.1)
1 Statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P < 0.01.
2 Marginal effects. 
3 Conditionally marginal effects.
4 Standard errors in parentheses.
338 NJAS 55-4, 2008
R. Fort
As can be seen from Table 6, the estimates for the OOP investments are almost 
identical in magnitude and as statistically significant as the ones obtained when 
the total number of investments was used. Limiting the sample to non-borrowing 
households increased the α3 coefficient by 1% on the MTS parcels, whereas on the 
LTS parcels it reduced the coefficient by the same percentage. These changes were not 
statistically significant when compared with the α3 coefficients for the full sample.23
These results suggest that the increase in investments was almost entirely driven by 
higher levels of tenure security brought by the title. 
Concluding remarks
The results of this paper indicate that land titling policies aiming to formalize 
individual land rights have a differentiating effect on investments, depending on the 
farmer’s level of tenure security over a parcel prior to initiating the policy. We showed 
that before the intervention of the programme, parcels could already be categorized 
into different levels of tenure security depending on the type of informal documents 
that farmers held. Accordingly, parcels with ‘stronger’ documents represented initially 
higher levels of investments than parcels with ‘weaker’ documents. The effect of the 
titling policy on the propensity to invest and on the value of investments was positive 
and statistically significant for both groups, but was larger on parcels with previously 
weaker levels of tenure security. This effect could almost entirely be attributed to 
changes in farmers’ willingness to invest and not to better access to credit.
 We expect that these results will contribute to the debate about the need for a 
Table 6. Difference-in-differences estimates 1 (standard errors in parentheses) of marginal (probit) and 
conditionally marginal (tobit) effects for OOP 2 investors and non-borrowers with medium (MTS) or low 
(LTS) tenure security.
Variable OOP investors   Non-borrowers
 Probit   Tobit  Probit  Tobit
 MTS  LTS  MTS LTS MTS LTS MTS LTS
 (n=2186) (n=1547) (n=2186) (=1547) (n=2039) (n=1437) (n=2039) (n=1437)
post (α1) –0.001 –0.004 6.4 –9.6 –0.005 –0.003 2.2 −7.8
 (0.013)  (0.014) (17.4) (23.8) (0.014) (0.014) (17.9) (24.8)
TR (α2) –0.028 * –0.044 ** –36.3 * –61.8 ** –0.033 ** –0.048 ** –40.6 ** −69.8 **
 (0.015) (0.018) (19.9) (30.2) (0.016) (0.019) (20.7) (32.2)
post ∑ TR (α3) 0.056 ** 0.088 *** 56.8 ** 111.9 *** 0.064 ** 0.076 *** 62.5 ** 104.1 **
 (0.028) (0.036) (29.5) (45.2) (0.03) (0.036) (31.0) (47.8)
1 Statistical significance: * = P 0.10; ** = P < 0.05; *** = P < 0.01.
2 OOP investor = investing from own pocket.
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public intervention in the formalization of land property rights, particularly in Latin 
America. Although farmers have access to informal land documents to increase their 
security over the land, we showed that this procedure is mostly limited to farmers that 
were already better off. It is at best an imperfect substitute for the acquisition of full-
fledged property titles such as provided by the PETT Programme. The differentiating 
effects of a title on investments in medium and low tenure security parcels, reinforced 
this idea and argue in favour of a public intervention to lift the limitations, enabling 
disadvantaged farmers to acquire tenure security through informal means. The 
recognition of different types of informal land rights and the reliance of the programme 
on community networks before the formalization of rights also appear to be 
fundamental for a successful intervention with a promising pro-poor orientation. 
 Finally, it is important to note that even though we found a justification for this 
type of intervention, there are many other aspects of the titling policy that need to be 
analysed in order to fully assess their potential effects and limitations. For example, 
the fact that the new investments brought by titling were mostly financed without the 
use of credit could indicate that they are limited to small and probably labour-intensive 
activities, which would not have a large impact on factor productivity or land values. 
When farmers were asked about their willingness to pursue more investments in 
land and about their principal constraints to do so, many of them pointed to the lack 
of credit as the main reason. So more work needs to be done in order to explore the 
constraints that farmers face in other markets and that can be influencing the potential 
effects of the programme.    
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Appendix 1 
A. Interaction effects of probit model
 Medium tenure security  Low tenure security
 Mean SD 1 Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Interaction effect 0.048 0.023 0.004 0.127 0.062 0.027 0.013 0.221
Standard error 0.024 0.010 0.003 0.058 0.029 0.011 0.009 0.093
z-value 1.936 0.203 1.044 2.251 2.106 0.289 1.309 2.688
1 SD = standard deviation.
B. Linear probability model
Variable Tenure security level 
 Medium Low
 (n = 2061) (n = 1476)
post (α1) 0.000 −0.004
 (0.017) 1 (0.018)
TR (α2) −0.032 * 2 −0.073 ***
 (0.019) (0.024)
post ∑ TR (α3) 0.057 ** 0.091 ***
 (0.025) (0.029)
1  Standard errors in parentheses.
2  Statistical significance: * = P < 0.10; ** = P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01.
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Notes
1 Following Bromley (1998), property right regimes comprise the nature of ownership, the rights and 
duties of the owners, the rules of use, and the locus of controls.
2 By ‘privatization’ we mean the change from a communal to a private ownership of a piece of land and 
the consequent assignment of rights at the individual level. This case could be thought of as creating 
more conflicts between previous customary rights and the new individual rights brought by titling. 
3 Depending on the region, the type of production, and the status of the member, they got between 2 
and 5 ha of land.
4 Sources: The Peruvian Ministry of Finance, The Inter-American Development Bank, and The World Bank.
5 This information was collected during personal interviews with PETT officials and is also available on 
the programme web page (<www.pett.gob.pe>).
6 SUNARP is the ‘Super Intendencia Nacional de Registros Publicos’. All this procedure is regulated under 
Legislative Decree (LD) 667 and its posterior modifications in LD 889 and Law Decrees 26838 and 27161.
7 The evaluation of the programme was in charge of a research team from the Group of Analysis 
for Development (GRADE). A partnership with the Development Economics Group of Wageningen 
University was established in the technical proposal that was sent to the public contest.
8 The coastal region was divided into the North-Coast and Center-South-Coast domains, and the Andean 
region into the North-Andean, Center-Andean, and South-Andean domains. 
9 The survey also includes some cases where farmers could not get the Certificate of Possession because 
of current conflicts over their land with other community members. These cases represented less than 
2% of the sample of parcels and were excluded from our analysis. 
10 A problem will arise if there are sectors where all parcels had proof of ownership so that farmers 
belonging to this sector will get titles faster than farmers belonging to mixed sectors or sectors where 
parcels only had possession documents. However, our evidence indicates that almost all sectors had 
parcels in both categories.  
11 The classification of documents into LTS or MTS could be disputed for the ones located close to the 
middle of this continuum. Therefore, we created alternative classifications by changing these documents 
from one group to the other. The results presented in this study were not altered by these changes. 
12 One concern related to the validity of this classification has to do with the possible relationship 
between the duration of possession of the parcel and the type of informal document that the farmer 
holds. If the decision to acquire an MTS document is made mostly after a certain number of years the 
plot has been worked, and perhaps only after some investments have been made on it, then duration 
of possession will probably be the most relevant variable to differentiate parcels into tenure security 
levels previous to titling. To show that this does not appear to be the case in our study, we looked at the 
distribution of the years of possession for parcels in the LTS and MTS groups, and found that there was 
no major difference in the mean years of possession between parcels in these two groups and also that 
their distributions looked very much the same (see Appendix 1 A and B). Moreover, the median value of 
the difference (in years) between the time of possession and the time with an MTS document is located 
at 0, which means that in most cases the MTS document for the parcel was acquired when the farmer 
started to work on that piece of land.
13 Total farm size and the number of household members at 1994 were obtained from the survey by 
using retrospective questions on land transactions and migration, respectively. 
14 This time period covers the whole 1st phase of the PETT Programme.
15 Data on the magnitude of investments, however, are likely to suffer from problems of measurement 
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errors. The discussion of results and implications will be based only on the findings related to the 
incidence of land-attached investments.
16 One problem with this set-up is that we introduced a negative bias in the impact estimate. Parcels 
T&R earlier in this period (e.g., 1995) could have made investments before 2000–2004 that will not be 
included. However, we believed this option is preferable to other ones in which we included investments 
made before T&R as outcomes of the programme. In that sense, we considered our impact estimates as a 
‘lower bound’. 
17 It is important to note that the final selected sample consisted of a balanced panel of parcels that 
belonged to the same owner in both periods of time. A small number of parcels (4% of total sample) were 
acquired after 1990 (had only information for period 2) and consequently were excluded from the analysis. 
18 A detailed explanation of this estimation technique can be found in Meyer (1995) and Wooldridge (2002).
19 This estimation is based on The Linear Probability Model for Binary Response of Wooldridge (2002), 
who suggests using a weighted least squares regression. 
20 It is worth noting that all the variables that are not time-invariant (like sex, location of parcel, or main 
language) were measured at the time of the survey (2004). To avoid potential endogeneity problems we 
did not include control variables that could also have been affected by the programme intervention. 
21 The difference between the number of observations used in this regression and in the DID 
regression is due to the method applied to construct variance weights for the linear probability model. 
Approximately 5% of the total sample of parcels had to be excluded for having a negative predicted value 
of the dependent variable. The comparison between a simple OLS regression with and without these 
observations yielded almost no difference in the value and significance of parameters.  
22 The study by Field (2005) applies a similar test to distinguish changes in ability versus changes in the 
willingness to invest for households participating in an Urban Land Titling Programme. Besley (1995) 
suggest that the collateral effects can be distinguished by adding a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
household has at least one parcel titled. As the PETT Programme titled all parcels located in the same 
valley at the same time, the households in our sample have either all or none of their parcels titled during 
the period 1994–2000, so that this method could not be implemented here.
23 The test for equality of the coefficients across samples reports a χ2(1) of 1.59 and a corresponding P-
value of 0.21 for the MTS parcels, and χ2(1) of 0.23 and P-value of 0.63 for the LTS parcels. 
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